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The Effect of Corporate Governance on the
Performance of US Investment Banks
BY EMMANUEL MAMATZAKIS AND THEODORA BERMPEI
This paper focuses on the impact of the corporate governance, using a plethora of measures,
on the performance of the US investment banks over the 2000–2012 period. This time
period offers a unique set of information, related to the credit crunch, that we model using
a dynamic panel threshold analysis to reveal new insights into the relationship between
corporate governance and bank performance. Results show that the board size asserts a
negative effect on performance consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis, particularly for
banks with board size higher than ten members. Threshold analysis reveals that in the post-
crisis period most of investment banks opt for boards with less than ten members, aiming to
decrease agency conflicts that large boards suffer from. We also find a negative association
between the operational complexity and performance. Moreover, the CEO power asserts a
positive effect on performance consistent with the ‘stewardship’ hypothesis. In addition, an
increase in the bank ownership held by the board has a negative impact on performance for
banks below a certain threshold. On the other hand, for banks with board ownership above
the threshold value this effect turns positive, indicating an alignment between shareholders’
and managers’ incentives.
Keywords: Investment Banking, Corporate governance, Performance, Board size, CEO
power, Board Ownership.
JEL Codes: G01, G21, G30, G32.
I. INTRODUCTION
The liberalization and globalization of financial services in combination with rapid
advances in the financial innovation have broadened significantly the variety of
operations in which investment banks engage in over the last two decades. Such
operations include the issuance of debt or equity securities in the primary market,
as well as the financial advisory services and the trading of securities in the
secondary market. As a result, the performance of investment banking industry,
through complex operations, is of utmost importance for the well-functioning
of global financial markets. Yet, only Radic et al. (2012) appear to examine
the underlying determinants of the performance of investment banks. This paper
bridges this gap in the literature and further reveals a crucial link between corporate
governance and the performance of these financial institutions.
Investment banking activities have been important particularly in the US econ-
omy as they captured more than half (58%) of the global investment banking
revenues in 2012, while the US investment banking accounted for 30% of the
total US banking industry profits during the same year. However, the investment
banking industry has also been held accountable for the credit crunch in 2008 that
hit the US and then spread globally. In fact, the turmoil reveals the possible detri-
mental impact of the investment banking on financial market (Brunnermeier and
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Pederson, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Moreover, the US financial
market, towards the end of the last decade, entered a period of unprecedented in-
stability where the estimated losses due to subprime mortgages were between 400
(US$bn) and 500 (US$bn). Consequently, investment banks went through some
very dramatic changes. Bear Stearns was acquired by JP Morgan with the finan-
cial support of the Federal Reserve Bank, Merrill Lynch had to raise a substantial
volume of capital to cover high realised losses on assets, whereas Lehman Broth-
ers filed for bankruptcy. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Acharya and
Richardson (2009) argue that part of the causes of the crisis should be attributed
to the considerably complex activities of investment banks. The shift of financial
institutions from deposit-taking activities into highly complex operations might
have contributed to the crisis resulting in the underperformance of investment
banks and the financial system as a whole (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).1
The degree of complexity of investment banking activities is related closely to
the corporate governance of investment banks. To this end, an inquest into the
operations of investment banks necessitates a detailed study of bank corporate
governance.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the corporate governance on invest-
ment bank performance. Due to the crisis of 2008, the governance of financial
institutions has been into the spotlight (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Erkens et al.,
2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013;Vallascas and Hagendorff,
2013), whilst a growing perception of the destructive role of the corporate gover-
nance with respect to the performance of banks has gained support (Kirkpatrick,
2009). Providing a concrete definition of corporate governance is not an easy task.
Gillan and Starks (1998) describe corporate governance as an internal mechanism
that is linked closely to the system of acts, laws, and dynamics that control the
operations of a firm. Therefore, the corporate governance of banks is particu-
larly complex, as these financial institutions are unique and differ fundamentally
from non-banking institutions. This in turn implies that corporate governance of
banks plays an important role due to the distinctiveness of these institutions. In
particular, banks have three main characteristics that motivate a separate exami-
nation of the corporate governance in banking. Firstly, according to the banking
theory the nature of financial intermediation makes banks more opaque com-
pared to other institutions due to the difficulty of outsiders to monitor bank assets
(Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Levine, 2004). Moreover, the special nature of banks
is reflected in the complexity of the bank business model (Furfine, 2001). The
high level of operational complexity is apparent particularly in investment banks
and distinguishes the business model of these financial institutions from that of
other types of banking and non-banking institutions (Acharya and Richardson,
2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Therefore, the issue of bank opacity
in combination with the complexity of investment banks’ business model makes
1Fernando et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms that had as their main equity underwriter Lehman
Brothers suffered economically and their earnings experienced a substantial fall.
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it difficult for the outside shareholders to monitor bank operations raising in this
way information asymmetries (Andres and Vallelado, 2008).
Secondly, banks are heavily leveraged institutions and this in turn can have im-
portant implications in terms of corporate governance (Hagendorff, 2014). Banks’
equity is relatively low compared to that of other institutions. However, sharehold-
ers in banks appear to control the main mechanisms of corporate governance, such
as the executive compensation and the board of directors. Hence, despite the fact
that creditors are more important than equity investors for the wealth of banks,
the shareholders of banks have a predominant role in the governance of banks
and thus can take decisions intended to maximize their own wealth. This is par-
ticularly important as shareholders are risk-neutral while creditors risk-averse and
thus they have different risk preferences (Hagendorff, 2014). This in turn suggests
that under high level of bank leverage the power of shareholder rises as they have
a key role in the decision-making process of banks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Hagendorff, 2014). In this case, shareholders hold large claims on bank’s assets
and hence they are encouraged to raise risk aiming to increase their equity value.
However, an increase of the bank risk would bear losses for creditors and thus this
would decrease their wealth.
Thirdly, regulation plays a crucial role for banking institutions due to the im-
portance of banks in the economy and the opacity of bank activities (Hagendorff,
2014). This special monitoring of regulators for banks is a form of supplementary
governance, for example the well-known restrictions imposed by the US regula-
tors on executive compensation. Moreover, with regards to the banking industry,
a government can also own banks and act on its own interests (Santomero, 1997).
Previous studies show that state-owned banks underperform compared to private
banks (Iannotta et al., 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009). This is due to the fact that
state-owned banks have to provide primarily funding for governmental projects
that might dampen bank performance (Altunbas et al., 2001).
Investment banks focus primarily in non-interest income activities and hence
they differ principally from other types of banks, such as commercial banks, that
concentrate on interest income operations (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).
In addition, after the hit of the financial crisis of 2008, government intervention
in the investment banking is particularly evident, as many US investment banks
had to convert their status into Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in order to gain
access in the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) support (Volcker, 2010) and other
funding programs, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The status
of investment banks as part of BHCs implies that the main stakeholders have
become other banks in the group and the government. These structural changes
could lead to a rise in moral hazard of investment banks because it enables them to
rely on the funds of other banking institutions that belong to the BHC (Mayer and
Carlyn, 2008) and on the ‘implicit government guarantee’ that the access to FDIC
support implies (Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006, 2013). Therefore, examining
the impact of the corporate governance on the performance of investments banks
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is important for both bank managers and regulators. Furthermore, an advantage of
our analysis is that it tests for threshold-effects of important corporate governance
variables with respect to bank performance over a period that covers the financial
crisis and the immediate period after. Possible changes in the percentage of banks
that belong to threshold regimes would imply transformations in the structure
of corporate governance mechanisms of investment banks before and after the
turmoil. Therefore, this study could also shed light on the effect of corporate gov-
ernance changes on investment bank performance since the period that investment
banks have been converted to BHCs.
The current banking literature focuses on various dimensions of corporate gov-
ernance. Table 1 presents an overview of the recent studies that examine the impact
of corporate governance on bank performance. A number of papers put emphasis
on board structure (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Tanna et al., 2011; Adams and
Mehran, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang et al., 2013), i.e., board size, board
composition and gender diversity, and its impact on bank performance. Other
studies look at the effect of the executive compensation and managerial incen-
tives on performance (Pi and Timme, 1993; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti
and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012) and bank risk (Vallascas and Hagendorff,
2013; Berger et al., 2014). A smaller amount of studies examine the relationship
between the CEO power and bank performance (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000) and
risk (Pathan, 2009). Lastly, there is also empirical evidence regarding the effect of
operational complexity on bank performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Hence,
according to the corporate governance literature there are five broad study areas:
board structure, executive compensation, managerial incentives, CEO power and
operational complexity.
In terms of methodology, there are also plethora of approaches. Some of the
above studies (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang et al.,
2013) use a dynamic panel regression framework (two-step ‘system’ GMM esti-
mator) for their analysis, while others (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and
Stulz, 2012) employ cross-sectional type of estimations as they examine only a
short period of time (2007–2008). However, employing a dynamic panel method
is more relevant in the context of this study, as it accounts for endogeneity issues
that arise from the examination of the relationship between corporate governance
and bank performance. Additionally, the well-known persistence in bank prof-
its (Berger et al., 2000) could be treated by the usage of the lagged dependent
variable among the regressors (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). With regards to the
methods employed for the estimation of bank performance most of the studies use
accounting-based indicators (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Andres and Vallelado,
2008; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang
et al., 2013), neglecting this way the importance of using a structural approach of
measuring performance, i.e. the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The SFA ap-
proach of measuring bank performance has the advantage of accommodating a full
set of information from bank balance sheets, and not just a single ratio as simple
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Table 1: Recent Studies on the Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Bank Performance
Years in Specialisation Measure of
References Countries in Sample sample of banks performance Methodology
Pathan and Faff
(2013)
United States 1997–2011 Bank Holding
Companies
(BHCs)
Tobin’s Q, ROA,
ROE, POI ratios
Two-step ‘system’
GMM estimator
Liang et al. (2013) China 2003–2010 Commercial banks ROA and ROE Two-step ‘system’
GMM estimator
Adams and Mehran
(2012)
United States 1965–1999 Bank Holding
Companies
(BHCs)
Tobin’s Q and ROA Fixed-effect
estimator
Aebi et al. (2012) United States 2007–2009 Commercial and
Saving banks
Buy-and hold
returns, ROA and
ROE
Time-series
regressions
Beltratti and Stulz
(2012)
United States 2007–2008 Commercial banks Buy-and hold
returns
Cross-sectional
regressions
Erkens et al. (2012) Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bermuda, Brazil, Canada,
China, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Morocco,
Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Russia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States
2007–2008 Commercial banks,
brokerages, and
insurance
companies
Buy-and hold
returns
OLS and Tobit
regressions
(Continued)
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Table 1: (Continued)
Years in Specialisation Measure of
References Countries in Sample sample of banks performance Methodology
Tanna et al. (2011) United Kingdom 2001–2006 Commercial, saving
and investment
banks*
Efficiency (Data
Envelopment
Analysis-DEA)
OLS
Fahlenbrach and
Stulz (2011)
United States 2007–2008 Commercial banks Buy-and hold
returns
Cross-sectional
regressions
Andres and
Vallelado (2008)
Spain, Italy, France, Canada,
United States, and United
Kingdom
1995–2005 Commercial banks Tobin’s Q, ROA
and annual
returns of bank
shareholders
Two-step ‘system’
GMM estimator
Choi and Hasan
(2005)
Korea 1998–2002 Commercial banks ROA, ROE and
Efficiency
OLS
Mishra and Nielsen
(2000)
United States 1975–1989 Bank Holding
Companies
(BHCs)
ROA and ROE OLS and 2SLS
Pi and Timme
(1993)
United States 1987–1990 Bank Holding
Companies
(BHCs)
ROA and
Efficiency
OLS and Tobit
regressions
*The list of the Bank of England’s (2006) Institutions included within the United Kingdom banking sector –nationality analysis.
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accounting indicators, whilst it is based on the fundamental notion of microeco-
nomic theory of optimising when it comes to performance. In addition, according
to Hughes and Mester (2010) using SFA for measuring bank performance reveals
bank managers’ preferences over revenues and costs as well as their underlying
risk attitude. In this paper, we opt for the SFA approach, whilst as part of a sensitiv-
ity analysis also employ accounting-based performance measures. Additionally,
the majority of existing studies examines the impact of corporate governance on
bank performance of commercial banks or BHCs (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000;
Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz,
2012; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang
et al., 2013). However, none of these studies focuses exclusively on the examination
of the underlying relationship between the corporate governance and performance
of investment banks.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It is the first
study to examine the impact of corporate governance on investment bank perfor-
mance during both the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Secondly, we employ a
comprehensive set of corporate governance measures that includes board structure,
compensation, managerial ownership, CEO power and operational complexity.
Thirdly, we use both simple accounting-based indicators and the SFA approach
to proxy for bank performance, providing in that way additional evidence for the
validity of our findings. Finally, for the first time we opt for a dynamic threshold
model (Kremer et al., 2013) to investigate possible threshold-effects of some key
corporate governance determinants of the investment bank performance under
a period of financial distress. The main advantage of this analysis is that dif-
ferent regimes are identified endogenously from the underlying data generating
process.
Our results show that the board size asserts a negative effect on performance
consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis, particularly for banks with board
size higher than ten members. The threshold analysis reveals that in the post-crisis
period most of investment banks opt for boards of less than ten members, aiming
to decrease agency conflicts endemic in large boards. We also find evidence of a
negative association between operational complexity and performance. Moreover,
CEO power asserts a positive effect on performance in line with the ‘stewardship’
hypothesis. In addition, an increase in the ownership held by the board has a nega-
tive impact on the performance of banks below an identified ownership threshold.
On the other hand, for banks with board ownership above the threshold value this
effect proves to be positive, indicating an alignment between shareholders’ and
managers’ incentives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the hypotheses
development and discusses further the related literature review. Section III intro-
duces the data while Section IV discusses the methodology. Section V provides
the empirical findings and Section VI concludes.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
BOARD SIZE AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Agency theory posits that a large board can be less efficient than a small board
due to a rise in agency conflicts because of inefficient communication and coop-
eration costs (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). On the contrary, an earlier
study by Pfeffer (1972) finds that board size is positively linked to the performance
of large firms. The reason being that large firms have a greater need of more board
members who can legitimate the company to its external environment. Andres and
Vallelado (2008) show that there exists an inverted U-shaped association between
the board size and bank performance for 69 commercial banks from six European
countries over the 1995–2005 period. This indicates that an increase in the number
of board members enhances the performance of banks, but when the board size
becomes very large this in turn can have the adverse effect on performance due to
high information asymmetries among the board members. Similarly, Pathan and
Faff (2013) study the impact of the board size on the performance of US BHCs
for the 1997–2011 period. They observe a negative relationship between the board
size and performance as estimated by Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) ratios. On the other hand,
Adams and Mehran (2012) observe the impact of the board size on the perfor-
mance of 35 BHCs over the 1965–1999 periods, concluding that board size is
positively related to bank performance as estimated by Tobin’s Q and ROA ratio.
Based on these arguments, the first hypothesis H1.A, along with the competing
hypothesis H1.B, can be defined as:
H1.A (H1.B): An increase in the number of board members could have a positive
(negative) effect on the performance of investment banks.
BOARD COMPOSITION AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that more independent oriented boards are
positively related with firm performance. Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that inde-
pendent directors minimize managerial entrenchment risk through their expertise
and objectivity in the decision-making process. Empirical evidence shows that
an increase in the number of independent directors has a positive impact on the
performance, in terms of return on invested capital and market-to-book values,
for a sample of European banks (Busta, 2007). Moreover, Tanna et al. (2011)
examine the impact of the board independence on the performance, as estimated
by various efficiency measures, of seventeen banking institutions in the UK. They
conclude that there exists a positive and significant relationship between the board
independence and bank efficiency over the period 2001–2006. On the contrary, ac-
cording to the ‘stewardship’ theory (Donaldson, 1990) there is no conflict between
the interests of shareholders and managers. Under this notion a rise in the pro-
portion of non-independent directors (insiders) could contribute positively to firm
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performance, as insiders have more experience and better firm-specific knowledge
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). Also, a higher level of independence may
result in infertile political activity by non-independent members that could lessen
the productivity of the outsiders and decrease the cooperation among the board
members (Westphal, 1998, 1999). In support of this argument, Erkens et al. (2012),
using a sample of 296 banks across 30 countries over the financial crisis period
(2007–2008), report that board independence dampens performance as measured
by buy-and-hold stock returns. Similarly, Pathan and Faff (2013) observe a nega-
tive relationship between performance, estimated by various financial indicators,
and board composition for the 1997–2011 period. By contrast, Choi and Hasan
(2005) find an insignificant effect of the board composition on performance, as
estimated by both accounting-based indicators (ROA and ROE) and profit effi-
ciency, for a sample of Korean banks over the 1998–2002 period. Following the
above discussion, the second hypothesis H2.A, along with the opposing hypothesis
H2.B, can be formulated as:
H2.A (H2.B): An increase in the proportion of independent directors could have
a positive (negative) impact on the performance of investment banks.
GENDER DIVERSITY AND BANK BERFORMANCE
Robinson and Dechant (1997) suggest that female directors are likely to be more
committed to their duties and communicate better with the other board directors.
In support of the view that women are more productive at this level of hierarchy,
Eagly and Carli (2003) argue that the ‘glass ceiling’ effect motivates females to
be even more proficient in order to reach these kind of positions in a firm. The
‘glass ceiling’ hypothesis describes the gender discrimination in a firm. Under
this hypothesis, there is misperception that women have inferior skills than men
and therefore the former face additional hurdles to enter the market and hold a
directorship (Martell, 1999; Baxter and Wright, 2000). Empirical evidence points
out in two different directions with respect to the impact of gender diversity on
the bank performance and risk. Pathan and Faff (2013) find that gender diversity,
estimated as the percentage of female directors in the board, has a positive impact
on bank performance proxied by Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and POI ratios. On the
other hand, Berger et al. (2013) document a negative relationship between an
increase in the number of female board directors and bank risk for a sample of
German banks over 1994–2010 periods. The reason being that females might have
less experience dealing with high risks compared to males board members. Thus,
the third hypothesis H3.A, along with the competing hypothesis H3.B, can be
stated as:
H3.A (H3.B): An increase in the proportion of female board members could have
a positive (negative) impact on the performance of investment banks.
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CEO POWER AND BANK PERFORMANCE
A CEO who also chairs the board (CEO duality) or has a long term relationship
with the company, i.e., CEO is the founder of the firm or has been a member of
the board before becoming CEO (‘internally’ hired CEO), has increased power
as can influence board decisions and reduce the independency of the board of
directors. According to the ‘entrenchment’ hypothesis, entrenchment risk occurs
when managers obtain so much power and are able to use it to maximize their
own utility rather than the value of shareholders (Weisbach, 1988; Finkelstein and
D’Aveni, 1994). Against this view, there is theoretical background termed as the
‘stewardship’ theory (Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990). This theory suggests that
a strong CEO would act as a good agent of company’s assets and a firm would
take advantage of the unity of direction and strong command and control that the
powerful CEO would offer. In support of the ‘entrenchment’ hypothesis, Mishra
and Nielsen (2000) find that for a sample of commercial banks the CEO who also
chairs the board (CEO ‘duality’) has a negative impact on their performance as
proxied by return on average asset (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE).
On the other hand, Pathan (2009) finds that the CEO duality decreases risk-taking
and in turn could improve bank performance for a sample of US BHCs over the
period 1997–2004. Drawing from these arguments, the fourth hypothesis H4.A,
together with the opposing hypothesis H4.B, can be defined as:
H4.A (H4.B): Higher CEO power could have a positive (negative) impact on the
performance of investment banks.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Executive compensation has been a popular subject area (Barro and Barro,
1990; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Crawford et al., 1995;
Bedchuk et al., 2009), whilst it frequently hits news headlines worldwide. It
is a subject that has been raising controversy for some time, in particular in the
aftermath of the financial meltdown in 2008. Compensation is typically categorised
into two forms: 1) cash that includes base salary and bonus 2) and equity-based
compensation that includes stock options and restricted stock grants and constitutes
a form of long-term compensation. Agency theorists argue that a long-term form
of compensation better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ incentives (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990), as long-term pay normally reward managers when they meet
firms’ performance goals (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011) examine the impact of the executive compensation on the performance of
77 banks for the 2007–2008 period. Their results show a positive association
between the equity-based compensation and performance, estimated as buy-and
hold returns, during the turmoil. Another study by Vallascas and Hagendorff
(2013) looks at the impact of the compensation on bank risk focusing on the
cash bonus payment of CEOs. They conclude that the CEO cash bonus has a
negative effect on bank default risk, implying a positive impact of the former on
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bank performance. Apart from the compensation of the CEO and its impact on
bank performance, the compensation of top executives (top management team,
TMT) has received very little empirical attention due to the assumption that the
compensation schemes of TMT are ‘isomorphic’ with those of the CEO (Carpenter
and Sanders, 2002). However, Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1996) and Henderson
and Fredrickson (2001) argue that there is no evidence to support the convergence
in the compensation of the CEO and TMT, while Hambrick (1995) shows that
there is large gap among them. Therefore, when one examines the relationship
between the CEO compensation and bank performance it is also important to
control for the effect of the TMT compensation. Overall, the above theoretical
and empirical analysis shows that the association between the CEO equity-based
compensation and performance could be positive, thus the fifth hypothesis can be
stated as:
H5: An increase in the CEO equity-based compensation could have a positive
impact on the performance of investment banks, after controlling for the TMT
compensation.
OWNERSHIP AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989), the distinction
of the ownership and managerial control leads to the misalignment between the
interests of the shareholders and those of the boards. Corporate governance ana-
lysts claim generally that managers’ interest are in line with shareholders’ when
the former have partial ownership of the company (Murphy, 1999). In support of
this perception, Pi and Timme (1993) find that for banks with non-chairman CEO
there is a positive relationship between ownership and performance, estimated
by ROA and efficiency, for a sample of US banks over the 1987–1990 periods.
Lately, the financial crisis has motivated researchers to examine the corporate
governance of banking entities in terms of managers’ incentives over the period
of the financial crisis. However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that there is
no statistical evidence to show that the CEO incentives were not aligned with the
shareholders’ interests during the period of the turmoil. Similarly, Beltratti and
Stulz (2012) stress that banks with higher proportion of board ownership operate
worse than banks with less board ownership for a sample of US banks over the
2007–2008 period. The reason being that banks with high ownership boards have
been positioned in ways that managers assumed that would maximize shareholder
wealth. However, this policy could potentially leave banks exposed to high risk and
could have a negative effect on bank performance. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis
H6.A and the competing hypothesis H6.B can be specified as:
H6.A (H6.B): An increase in the managerial ownership could have a positive
(negative) impact on the performance of investment banks.
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OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Operational complexity denotes the variety of activities, which are related to a
firm’s operations (Child, 1972). The higher the level of complexity a firm has, the
more apparent becomes the need of higher expertise and knowledge specific to the
environment. This implies that co-ordination problems between specialists rise
and can increase correspondingly communication costs of the firm (Lawrence and
Lorch, 1967). Adams and Mehran (2012) observe a negative impact of complexity
on bank performance, which is consistent with the theoretical argument advanced
by Lawrence and Lorch (1967). In addition, Adams and Mehran (2012) find that
this negative effect turns to be positive when banks have more lead directors that sit
on subsidiary boards. These directors are capable of managing effectively the bank
and hence can deal with increased complexity. This also implies that banks might
need more independent members in their boards, because these board members
are able to improve the expertise and knowledge that banks need. However, as
the director independency increases, the level of the attendance and effort of
independent members on board and committee meeting decreases, resulting in
the rise of free-riding problems that large banks suffer from (Jensen, 1993). The
above discussion shows that the association between the operational complexity
and performance could be negative after controlling for committee and board
related variables, thus:
H7: An increase in the operational complexity could have a negative impact on
the performance of investment banks, after controlling for board and committee
related variables.
III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
DATA
Our sample consists of the major 23 listed investment banks headquartered in the
US with standard industry classification (SIC) of 6211 and 6282. Our unbalanced
panel dataset includes 203 observations over the period 2000–2012. The data are
collected from DEF 14A proxy statements, 10-K annual reports, Bankscope and
Thomson Financial’s Banker.
The corporate governance data are hand collected from DEF 14A proxy state-
ments of annual meetings found in the SECs EDGAR filings. Following previous
studies (Pathan, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013) gover-
nance data are measured from the date of the proxy statement. Financial informa-
tion on investment banks comes from Thomson Financial Banker as well as from
10-K annual reports of SEC’S filings and Bankscope. We include only the listed
investment banks as information on corporate governance data are standardised
through the SEC Edgar platform. Our main inclusion criterion is that our sample
is consisted by financial institutions that their main source of income includes
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fees, commission and trading revenues, reflecting in that way investment banks’
distinctive operational nature.
Our corporate governance data comprise five general dimensions; board struc-
ture, CEO-power, compensation of the CEO and TMT, ownership of CEO and
board members and operational complexity measures. In particular, we account
for three board characteristics, namely board size, board composition and gen-
der diversity. The first two variables have been used extensively in the corporate
governance literature (Staikouras et al., 2007; Busta, 2007; Adams and Mehran,
2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Tanna et al., 2011). Board size is the number
of members that constitutes the board, while board composition refers to the pro-
portion of independent members in the board. Gender diversity is the percentage
of females in the boardroom (Shrader et al., 1997; Campel and Minguez-Vera,
2008; Francoeur et al., 2008).
We employ two measures of CEO power; CEO duality and ‘internally’ hired
CEO. CEO duality is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the
board as well, and 0 otherwise (Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Donaldson and
Davis, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Daily, 1995; Boyd, 1995; Baliga et al.,
1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Ballinger and Marcel, 2010). CEO ‘internally’ hired is
a dummy variable that takes the value of one 1 if the CEO is either the founder
or has been member of the board before being moved to the CEO position, while
otherwise it takes the value of zero (Adams et al., 2005; Pathan, 2009; Fahlenbrach
2009). As additional CEO characteristics, we control for the CEO tenure and the
CEO age. The CEO tenure is estimated by the number of years that the CEO
has served in the same position (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 2008;
Pathan and Faff, 2013). Finally, the CEO age stands for the age that the CEO has
(Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 2008).
In order to examine the impact of the ownership on bank performance we
use the number of shares hold by the CEO and TMT as the percentage of to-
tal outstanding number of bank’s shares (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Aebi et al.,
2012). We also control for the cash short-term incentives by employing the ratio
of bonus over total cash compensation of the CEO and the TMT (Fahlenbrach and
Stulz, 2011). Moreover, we examine the impact of cash and equity compensation
of CEO and TMT on investment bank performance. The natural logarithm of
cash-based compensation includes the base salary and bonus, while the natural
logarithm of equity-based compensation includes restricted stock and stock op-
tions. Decomposition of the compensation has been used in a number of studies
that investigate differences on the impact of cash-based and equity-based compen-
sation on performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Frye, 2004; Carpenter
and Sanders, 2002). We also examine the impact of the operational complexity on
bank performance. Operational complexity is proxied by the number of different
business segments (Booth and Deli, 1999; Bushman et al., 2004; Linck et al.,
2007) and subsidiaries (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Moreover, we control for the
total outstanding number of board committees (Vafeas, 1999), the fees paid to the
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board committees and the number of audit committee meetings (Xie et al., 2003;
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006).
Turning to the bank-specific control variables that are not related to corporate
governance, we opt for the ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy of leverage
(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). We also use the ratio of other earning
assets over total assets in line with Beltratti and Stulz (2012), so as to capture the
different nature of investment banks centered on equity issuance and underwriting
activities. We further employ the ratio of investment banking fees over total assets
as the non-interest income reflects the main source of income of investment banks
(Radic et al., 2012). Lastly, we control for the insolvency risk as estimated by the
z-score introduced by Boyd’s and Graham (1986).2
In addition, in our analysis we account for the regulatory mandates with the
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 as a dummy, which takes
the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of 1 otherwise consistent with
Pathan and Faff (2009).3 We also impose a crisis dummy, which takes the value
of 1 if year is 2007–2010 and zero otherwise in order to account for the financial
crisis period (Pathan and Faff, 2009; De Jonghe et al., 2012). Finally, in order
to capture the market risk we use the Volatility Implied Index indicator (VIX).4
This financial indicator suggests that higher levels of VIX reflect higher degrees
of financial turmoil in the US (Whaley, 2000).
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables are provided in
Table 2.
The sample mean of board size in Panel A of Table 3 is 8.30, which is similar
to that of 10 in Coles et al. (2008) and 9 in Francis et al. (2012). Moreover, our
sample mean of gender diversity of 0.11 is comparable to that of 0.076 in Pathan
and Faff (2013). Turning to CEO characteristics, the sample mean of CEO duality
is 0.72, while that of CEO ‘internally’ hired is 0.65 which is similar to that of 0.58
in Pathan and Skully (2010). The CEO age sample mean is 55.35 (years), which
is comparable to that of 56.26 in Cornett et al. (2009). Also, the mean tenure of
the CEO is 7.74 (years) and is similar to that of 8.85 in Pathan and Skully (2010).
With regards to the ownership, the sample mean of board ownership is 12.27%,
which is comparable to that of 10.25% in Pathan and Skully (2010) and to that
of 9.63% in Andershon and Fraser (2000). Our CEO ownership sample mean is
6.08% which is consistent to that reported (4.41%) by Pathan and Skully (2010).
2Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE. The z-score has been used in recent banking studies
(Lepetit et al., 2008; Radic et al., 2012).
3In particular, Section 301 of SOX Act obligates the audit committee to be comprised solely by
independent members.
4VIX is the volatility implied index for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. For the
data collection we use Bloomberg database.
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Table 2: Definitions of Variables Used in the Fixed Effect and Dynamic Panel Estimations
Variables Measures
Corporate governance (explanatory
variables)
Board size (BS) The number of members in the board (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed effect and
dynamic panel estimations)
Board composition% (IND) The percentage of independent directors
Gender diversity(GD) The percentage of female directors
CEO ‘internally’ hired (CEOIN) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with
the bank, and 0 otherwise
CEO duality (CEODUAL) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise
CEO tenure (CEOTEN) The number of years that the CEO has served in the position (we use the natural logarithm in the
fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
CEO age (CEOAGE) The age of the CEO (we use the natural logarithm, in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
Executives’ Compensation (bonus &base
salary) (EXECASH)
The cash compensation of the top management team, which includes base salary and bonus (we
use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
Executives’ Compensation (equity)
(EXEEQ)
The equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock
options (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
CEO Compensation (bonus &base salary)
(CEOCASH)
The cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus (we use the natural
logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
CEO Compensation (equity) (CEOEQ) The equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options (we use
the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel)
Executives’ bonus incentive (EXEBON) The ratio of bonus over executives’ total cash compensation
CEO’s bonus incentive (CEOBON) The ratio of bonus over CEOs’ total cash compensation
Board ownership% (BOARDOWN) The percentage shares that the directors hold
(Continued)
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Table 2: (Continued)
Variables Measures
CEO ownership% (CEOOWN) The percentage shares that the CEO holds
Number of board committees (NBCOM) The number of board committees (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel
estimations)
Fees paid for board meetings (FBCOM) Fees paid to directors for attending the board committees (we use the natural logarithm in the
fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
Number of audit committee meetings
(NMAUD)
Number of meetings of audit committee (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic
panel estimations)
Number of Segments (SEG) Number of different business segments (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic
panel estimations)
Number of Subsidiaries (SUBS) Number of subsidiaries (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)
Performance measures (dependent
variables)
1. Return on average assets (ROAA) The net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets.
2. Return on average equity (ROAE) The net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity
3. Pre-tax operating income (POI) The pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets
4. Profit efficiency (EFF) Efficiency scores obtained from the SFA
Other control variables
Equity over total assets (E/TA) The ratio of equity over total asset
Investment banking fees (FEES) The ratio of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets
Other earnings assets (EARN) The ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets
Risk to default (RISK) Z-score = (1+Average ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE
Volatility Implied Index (VIX) Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act period (PSOX) A dummy, which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of 1 otherwise
Crisis period (CRS) A dummy, which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Employed in the Fixed Effect
and Dynamic Panel Regressions
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX Median
Panel A: Corporate Governance Variables
BS 8.3 3.5 5 16 9
IND 0.66 0.25 0.4 0.92 0.71
GD 0.11 0.1 0 0.44 0.11
CEOIN 0.65 0.48 0 1 1
CEODUAL 0.72 0.49 0 1 1
CEOTEN 7.74 8.25 0 41 5
CEOAGE 55.35 8.18 39 72 56
BOARDOWN 12.27 15.43 0 67.21 6.68
CEOOWN 6.08 8.59 0.01 55.71 1.83
NBCOM 3.32 1.20 0 6 3
FBCOM 0.31 1.031 0 1,25 0
NMAUD 8.01 4.04 0 18 8
SEG 3.04 1.76 0 8 3
SUB 114.6 236.4 0 1255 15
EXECASH 16,500 20,700 0 139,000 7,897
EXEEQ 20,100 30,300 0 209,000 7,234
CEOCASH 4,303 6,063 0 41,200 1,950
CEOEQ 5,720 8,219 0 42,400 1,356
Panel B: Bank-Specific and Country Level Variables
E/TA 0.2324 0.2456 0.0105 0.97 0.1022
FEES 0.4703 0.8905 0.0004 5.21 0.0676
EARN 0.6094 0.3765 0.0001 3.756 0.6638
RISK 3.0961 6.3524 −42.59 52.82 2.1066
VIX 20.97 7.5946 11.56 40 21.68
Panel C: Bank Performance Measures
ROAE 8.02 29.77 −305.05 122.82 8.97
ROAA 1.96 11.73 −50.6 72.97 0.74
POI 3.32 14.99 −63.15 91.17 0.99
EFF 0.65 0.39 0.12 0.97 0.78
Panel D: Year By Year Corporate Governance Variables
Year BS IND CEODUAL CEOOWN BOARDOWN
2000 8.7 0.66 0.80 6.78 10.40
2001 8.2 0.65 0.92 5.68 9.75
2002 7.8 0.60 0.87 6.92 9.89
2003 7.4 0.60 0.80 6.91 11.11
2004 8.9 0.69 0.87 7.97 9.23
2005 8.5 0.68 0.81 7.45 9.64
2006 9.0 0.69 0.83 7.30 13.57
(Continued)
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Table 3: (Continued)
Panel D: Year By Year Corporate Governance Variables
Year BS IND CEODUAL CEOOWN BOARDOWN
2007 8.5 0.66 0.82 6.39 14.20
2008 8.1 0.64 0.60 2.84 13.05
2009 8.4 0.66 0.59 7.35 14.84
2010 8.1 0.66 0.56 5.27 12.91
2011 8.0 0.66 0.47 4.08 14.57
2012 8.4 0.67 0.46 3.73 14.05
Notes: The Table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the fixed
effect and dynamic panel regressions All variables are in absolute values except of the
compensation determinants (EXECASH, EXEEQ, CEOCASH and CEOEQ) which are
in million dollars. BS: the number of members in the board; IND: the percentage of
independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; CEOIN: a dummy that
takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the
bank, and 0 otherwise; CEODUAL: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs
the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has
served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; BOARDOWN: the percentage
shares that the directors hold; CEOOWN: the percentage of shares that the CEO holds;
NBCOM: the number of board committees; NMAUD: the number of meetings of audit
committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the board committees; SEG: the
number of different business segments; SUBS: number of subsidiaries; EXECASH: the cash
compensation of the top management team which includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ:
the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and
stock options; CEOCASH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary
and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock
and stock options; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: net fees, commission and net
trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills
and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score = (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; VIX:
Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index); ROAE: net
income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; ROAA: net
income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets;
POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; EFF: efficiency
scores obtained from the SFA.
The sample mean of the number of board committees is 3.32, and is in line to that
found (4.9) by Adams and Mehran (2003). Lastly, the sample mean of the total
outstanding number of business segment is 3.04, which is also comparable to that
of 2.6 in Coles et al. (2008).
In Panel B of Table 3 we present some descriptive statistics of control variables,
namely E/TA, FEES, EARN, Z-SCORE and the VIX financial indicator. The
sample mean of return on average equity, ROAE, in Panel C of Table 3 is 8.02%,
which is similar to the sample mean of 9.92% in Pathan and Faff (2013). Moreover,
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our mean efficiency score for the US investment banks is 0.65, which is similar to
the sample mean of 0.66 in Radic et al. (2012).
Panel D shows an upward trend in the average percentage of independent
members of the board over time, with a notable increase from 60% in 2003 to
69% in 2006. This increase is attributed to the independent board requirements
imposed by SOX. Lastly, we also observe that the mean of the CEO ownership
was sharply reduced from 6.39% in 2007 to 2.84% in 2008.
IV. METHODOLOGY
BANK PERFORMANCE MEASURES
There are two broad approaches to evaluate bank performance; 1) the struc-
tural method is based on the economics of profit maximization or cost mini-
mization under which bank performance is estimated as a function (profit or
cost) by employing either a parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis-SFA) or a
non-parametric methodology (Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA). This approach
involves the estimation of an efficient frontier, where best-practice banks operate,
and the measurement of the distance between the point that less efficient banks
operate and the efficiency frontier. 2) the non-structural method refers on realized
bank performance measured by a number of financial indicators. These indica-
tors are the accounting-based performance ratios such as return on average assets
(ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) as
a percentage of the average total assets (Chen, 2009; Mensah et al., 2012; Hughes
and Mester, 2013). In addition, non-structural measures involve indicators that are
based on the market value of the bank, such as the Tobin’s q, which have been used
in the banking literature to gauge the performance of banks (Adams and Mehran,
2008; Peni and Va¨ha¨maa, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013).5
There are numerous empirical studies (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al.,
2005; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Casu and
Girardone, 2010; Sun and Chang, 2011; Barth et al., 2013) that employ struc-
tural methods (SFA or DEA) to evaluate bank performance, while others use
accounting-based financial ratios (Klapper and Love, 2004; Athanasoglou et al.,
2008; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Aebi et al., 2012). In our study, we employ the SFA ap-
proach as estimated by a profit function and three accounting-based ratios, namely
ROAA, ROAE and POI. The reason that we employ a profit function, instead of
a cost-function, is because corporate governance can be seen as a set of internal
mechanisms aiming to maximize the value of a bank (Denis et al., 2001). Besides,
investment banks are revenue-motivated institutions and hence the profit function
5According to Hughes and Mester (2013, p. 9–16) ‘The traditional structural approach usually relies
on the economics of cost minimization or profit maximization, where the performance denotes a cost
function or a profit function . . . The non-structural approach to bank performance measurement usually
focuses on achieved performance measured by a variety of financial ratios, e.g., return-on-asset, return
on-equity, or the ratio of fixed costs to total costs.’
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Table 4: Correlation of Efficiency And Accounting-Based Ratios
EFF ROAE ROAA POI
EFF 1
ROAE 0.0952 1
ROAA 0.0889 0.6915 1
POI 0.1107 0.6701 0.7913 1
Notes: The Table shows the correlation of efficiency and accounting-based ratios for a
sample of US investment banks over 2000–2012 periods. EFF denotes the profit efficiency
scores obtained from the SFA, ROAE is the return on equity, ROAA is the return on assets
and POI denotes the pre-tax operating income.
is appropriate when one estimates the efficiency of these financial institutions
consistent with Radic et al. (2012). In addition, ‘profit maximization is superior
to cost minimization for most purposes because it is the more accepted economic
goal of firm’s owners’ as argued by Berger and Mester (1999, p. 3).
By employing both the profit function and accounting ratios we rely on two
different approaches, strengthening in that way the robustness of our results. One
might argue that because SFA’s efficiency scores and accounting-based perfor-
mance indicators might be highly correlated that in turn would lead both estimation
approaches to give similar results. The SFA approach of measuring bank perfor-
mance has the advantage of accommodating a full set of information from bank
balance sheets, and not just a single ratio as in accounting indicators, whilst it is
based on the fundamental notion of microeconomic theory of optimising when
it comes to performance. In addition, according to Hughes and Mester (2010)
using SFA for measuring bank performance reveals bank managers’ decisions,
regarding expected revenues, costs and the underlying risk. Furthermore, Beccalli
(2007) argue that accounting-based ratios do not count for changes in the produc-
tion process, input and output mix. Therefore, these two performance measures
(SFA and accounting-based indicators) might reflect different type of information
and thus the correlation between them might be fairly low. Indeed, our findings
show that the correlation between profit efficiency scores (EFF) and the three
accounting based ratios (ROAA, ROAE and POI) is positive but is relatively low
(see Table 4), as in Bauer et al. (1998) and Koetter (2006).
We opt for the SFA, as introduced by Aigner et al. (1977), to estimate profit
efficiency scores. The advantage of this parametric methodology relative to the
non-parametric (DEA) approach is that both the random error and inefficiency
are combined in a composite error term (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). To do so
we use a fixed-effect specification where efficiency scores are independently and
identically distributed (Greene, 2002).
In particular we use the following specification for the profit frontier:
TPi t = f (Pi t ,Yi t , Ni t )+ vi t + ui t (1)
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where TPi t is pre-tax profits for bank i in year t.6 Pi t is a vector of input prices,
Yi t is a vector of outputs, Ni t is a fixed net-put. The term vi t stands for the error
term, while ui t denotes bank inefficiency.
Moreover the translog profit function, opted in the paper, takes the form:
ln Pi,t = α0 +
∑
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αi ln Pi,t +
∑
i
βi lnYi,t + 1
/
2
∑
i
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∑
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∑
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Ordinary linear homogeneity and symmetry limitations are employed. We esti-
mate equation 2 with a maximum likelihood method parameterized based on the
variance parameters:7
σ 2ε = σ
2
u + σ
2
v and β = σ 2u /σ 2ε (3)
Following Sealey and Lindley (1977) we employ the ‘intermediation’ approach
in order to define bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that banks use
labour and capital in order to collect funds and transform them into loans and
other earning assets. We follow this approach that is used in numerous previous
studies (Altunbas et al., 2001; Isik and Hasan, 2002, 2003; Fries and Taci, 2005;
Casu and Girardone, 2006; Gaganis and Pasiouras; 2013) to estimate efficiency
and which is also employed by Radic et al. (2012) who are the only ones to this
date to examine the performance of investment banks in terms of profit efficiency.
Hence, with regards to the inputs used we also employ the price of labour and
physical capital, which is the norm in the banking literature (Berger and Mester,
1997). The price of labour is measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total
assets, while the price of physical capital is measured as the ratio of operating
expenses to fixed assets. The selection of outputs for investment banks should
reflect their operational nature and hence we could not use loans, because this
6In order to deal with negative values of profits we follow the approach suggested by Bos and Koetter
(2011). In particular, negative values of profits are replaced by the value of 1 in the left had side, while
simultaneously we use a new variable, namely negative profit indicator at the right hand side. This
indicator in case of losses takes the absolute value of negative profits while in case of positive profits
takes the value of 1.
7We estimate bank-specific efficiency scores using the distribution of efficiency term conditional to
the estimate of the composite error term as in Jondrow et al. (1982).
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is the standard output used for the efficiency estimation of commercial banks.
Investment banks differ fundamentally from commercial banks, as the former
engage primarily in non-interest operations and hence they lack the deposit base
that conventional banks have. Therefore, for the selection of the outputs we follow
Radic et al. (2012) and employ two outputs that are associated closely to the
operational nature of investment banks; 1) we use the sum of other earning assets
that include trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds 2) and the total
level of investment banking fees that include net commission, fees and trading
gains and comprises the main source of income of investment banks. Lastly, as
fixed netput, we employ the total level of fixed assets that is also standard in the
literature related to efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and
Mester, 2003).
SECOND STAGE REGRESSIONS
Dynamic Panel Analysis
For the second-stage regressions, we opt for the two-step ‘system’ GMM esti-
mator (Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), as used in previous
papers to examine the relationship between corporate governance and bank per-
formance (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Liang et al., 2013; Pathan and Faff, 2013),
aiming to account for endogeneity issues.8 In addition to this, the documented
persistence in bank profits (Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2004) is treated by
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors, according
to Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Therefore, the use of the dynamic panel two-step
‘system’ GMM estimator is relevant to the context of this study. The two-step
estimates of standard errors are likely to be downward biased (Blundell and Bond,
1998) and thus we follow a finite sample correction introduced by Windmeijer
(2005). The estimates are also tested via Hansen’s diagnostic test for instrument
validity and the test for second-order autocorrelation of error terms introduced by
Arellano and Bond (1991).
The dynamic panel model that we use takes the following form:
(Perform)i,t =
[
a0 + ϕ(Perform)i,t−1 + a1 (PSOX)t + a2 (C RS)t
+β j
n∑
j=1
(Corpor− Govern)i,t + γ j
1∑
j=1
(Control)i,t + ei,t
]
(4)
where i signifies individual investment bank (i = 1, 2, . . . , 23) and t is the pe-
riod that we cover (t = 2000, 2001, . . . , 2012). α, β, γ are parameters to be
estimated. (Perform)i,t is the dependent variable and stands for the performance of
investment banks estimated by ROAA, ROAE, POI and EFF, while (Perform)i,t−1
stands for the lagged performance dependent variable. (PSOX)t is a dummy
8For the GMM estimation we use Roodman (2009) “xtabond 2” specification in Stata.
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variable that takes the value of 0 in the post SOX period (2000–2001) and 1
otherwise. (CRS)t is a crisis dummy that takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010,
and 0 otherwise. (Cor por − Govern)i,t consists of five different dimensions of
corporate governance variables: 1) board size, board composition and gender di-
versity 2) CEO ‘internally’ hired, CEO duality, CEO age and CEO tenure 3)
cash-based and equity-based compensation of the TMT and CEO 4) CEO/board
ownership and CEO/TMT bonus as a percentage of total cash compensation and
5) number of business segments, number of subsidiaries, number of board com-
mittees, fees paid for the attendance of members in board committees and number
of audit committee meetings. (Control)i,t comprises of a number of bank-specific
and country-level control variables while ei,t denotes the error term.9
THRESHOLD DYNAMIC PANEL ANALYSIS
As a further step, we employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology (Kremer
et al., 2013) to identify possible threshold-effects in important corporate gover-
nance determinants of the performance of investment banks.10 The main advantage
of this econometric technique is that identifies threshold values of key corporate
governance variables and could observe any change on the impact of these thresh-
old variables on bank performance under the examined period. This is important
particularly as our study covers the period of financial crisis where major changes
in the number of banks that belong to each threshold regime might be identified,
suggesting important changes in the underlying structure of corporate governance
mechanism of investment banks before and after the turmoil. Note that we use
this methodology for two of the corporate governance variables found, in the ini-
tial dynamic panel regressions, to be negatively associated to the performance of
investment banks. These are the board size and the board ownership.
Therefore our equation takes the following specification:
performi t = µ+ λ1mi t I (qi t ≤ γ )+ δ1I (qi t ≤ γ )+ λ2mi t I (qi t > γ )+ εi t ,
(5)
where performi t is the dependent variable (ROAE) and µ is the bank-specific fixed
effect parameter. The two reverse regression slopes are λ1 and λ2 and are defined
based on the assumption that there exist two regimes. qi t stands for the threshold
variable (board size and board ownership), γ is the threshold value that splits the
observations into two regimes: 1) above the threshold value (high regime), and 2)
9For the regressions where we employ EFF as a measure of bank performance, we exclude from the
regression models two bank-specific control variables, FEES and EARN, which are used as outputs in
the estimation of profit efficiency using SFA.
10In this study, we use the model proposed by Kremer et al. (2013). That is an extension of the threshold
methodology introduced by Hansen (1999). The extended method of Kremer et al. (2013) is built on
the cross sectional technique of Caner and Hansen (2004), where GMM estimators are employed to
account for endogeneity. As an extension to Caner and Hansen (2004) model, Kremer et al. (2013) opt
for a dynamic threshold methodology.
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below the threshold value (low regime). εi t stands for the residual. I is the indicator
term that signifies the regime specified by the threshold variable qit and the
threshold value γ.As in Kremer et al. (2013), we use mi t as a vector of independent
variables.11 Moreover, Kremer et al. (2013) extends the Hansen’s (1999) model by
including the regime dependent intercept, δ1. Bick (2007) suggests that ignoring
the regime intercepts would cause biased estimation of the threshold value and the
scale of the regimes’ coefficients.12
V. DISCUSSION
DYNAMIC PANEL ANALYSIS
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the dynamic panel analysis. The ap-
propriateness of the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is held by the signifi-
cant lagged performance variable in all the corresponding models of Tables 5, 6
and 7. Moreover, regarding basic diagnostics the tests (AR(2)) for second-order
autocorrelation in second differences and the Hansen J-statistics of over-
identifying restrictions are insignificant (see Tables 5, 6 and 7).
With regards to the board size, we find a strong negative impact of the board size
on bank performance. The result remains robust at the 1% level (Table 5, Models 2
and 3) and at the 10% (Table 5, Models 4 and 4) level of significance. This finding
supports the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis by Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggesting
that an increase in the members of the board could result in higher information
asymmetry and communication costs. We also find that the CEO duality has a
positive impact on bank performance at the 5% (Table 5, Model 5) and the 10%
significance level (Table 5, Model 8), consistent with the ‘stewardship’ hypothesis
(Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990). Under this hypothesis, the CEO who chairs the
board would act as a good agent of the firm and would offer unity of direction
and strong control, resulting in the improvement of performance. Our finding is
consistent with numerous of previous studies (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Boyd,
1995; He and Wang, 2009). Although there is robust evidence to support that the
CEO duality has a positive impact on bank performance, there is no empirical
study to examine the relationship between the ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank
performance. Our results also lend support to the ‘stewardship’ hypothesis as
11We include all the explanatory variables of dynamic panel estimations apart from the crisis (CRS)
dummy variable. The reason being that we opt for the threshold methodology to allow our data to
determine this period of the turmoil through the identification of changes in the number of invest-
ment banks that belong to each regime based on threshold values of important corporate governance
determinants of investment bank performance.
12We measure a short type regression to obtain the predicted values of the endogenous variables using a
function of instruments (Caner and Hansen, 2004). As a first step, the endogenous variable is replaced
with the predicted values in equation (5). As a second step, threshold value is obtained via OLS method
where the threshold variable has been replaced by its predicted values estimated in the first step. The
threshold value is obtained so as to minimize the concentrated sum of squared errors (Chan, 1993;
Hansen, 1997). Once threshold value has been determined, the regression slopes, λ1 and λ2 can be
estimated by employing the GMM estimator, as in Caner and Hansen (2004).
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Table 5: Dynamic Panel Regressions Over the Period 2000 to 2012 For US Investment Bank Performance (Board Structure
and CEO Characteristics)
Board Structure CEO Characteristics
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8)
Lag performance 0.3539** 0.3405** 0.3612*** 0.986*** 0.2088** 0.1874** 0.4721** 0.976***
(0.1426) (0.1664) (0.1207) (0.142) (0.0906) (0.087) (0.1974) (0.178)
E/TA 0.3842 −0.5491** −0.1291 −0.00016 −1.412*** −0.5543** −0.6541** 0.00143
(0.4728) (0.2332) (0.0916) (0.00052) (0.268) (0.2681) (0.2962) (0.00119)
EARN −0.0312 −0.0595*** 0.0470 – 0.0319 −0.0317** −0.0115
(0.0406) (0.0205) (0.0387) (0.0420) (0.0178) (0.0207) –
FEES −0.0515 0.0240 0.0611** – 0.5491*** 0.3566 −0.0019
(0.0674) (0.0486) (0.0287) (0.131) (0.297) (0.0415) –
RISK 0.0007 −0.0007 0.0024 −3.15e-06 −0.0003 0.0004 0.0056
(0.0097) (0.004) (0.0037) (9.49e-06) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0035) 0.0005
PSOX −0.0959** −0.0397*** 0.0398 0.00016 −0.0564*** −0.0981*** −0.0460 (0.0013)
(0.0477) (0.0151) (0.0347) (0.0001) (0.0161) (0.0272) 0.0750 −0.000135**
VIX −0.0079** −0.0043*** −0.0066** −0.0000* −0.0063** −0.0067** 8.38e-06 (0.00059)
(0.0031) (0.0011) 0.0033 (9.77e-06) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.00590) −0.00008*
CRS −0.0906* −0.0647** −0.0942* −0.0001** 0.0320 0.0431 −0.1286*** (0.00004)
(0.0498) (0.0329) (0.0562) (0.00005) (0.0136) (0.3281) (0.0429) 0.00092
BS 0.01922 −0.0316*** −0.5018*** −0.00017* – – – –
(0.0351) (0.0096) (0.1815) (0.0001)
IND 0.2335 −0.0468 −0.2072 −0.00033 – – – –
(0.3347) (0.1247) (0.2235) (0.00051)
GD 0.1131 0.0031 0.0855 0.0000 – – – –
(0.7499) (0.0513) (0.3851) (0.00006)
(Continued)
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Table 5: (Continued)
Board Structure CEO Characteristics
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8)
CEODUAL – – – – 0.2512** 0.2218 0.0035 0.00573*
CEOAGE (0.1165) (0.7688) (0.0918) (0.00294)
0.3077 −0.1195 −0.0342 0.00315
– – – – (0.2703) (0.3716) (0.2737) (0.0105)
CEOTEN −0.1493 0.3609 −0.0030 0.00015
– – – – (0.0705) (0.3522) (0.0267) (0.00012)
CEOIN – – – – 0.3960** 0.1759*** 0.183** 0.0012
(0.1875) (0.0635) (0.079) (0.0019)
Constant −0.1441 0.3732*** 1.195*** −0.0011 −0.1271 0.5608 0.2348 0.00749
(0.3266) (0.0830) (0.3613) (0.0007) (1.465) (1.545) (1.141) (0.0404)
Wald chi2 216.22*** 94.41*** 335.68*** 479.25*** 133478.85*** 73.56*** 68.30*** 145.39***
AR(1) test stat −2.10** 1.69* −1.69* −2.27** −1.96* 2.03** −1.72* −2.18**
AR(2) test stat 0.95 0.35 −0.32 −0.15 0.26 0.63 −1.03 −0.23
Hansen J-stat 1 0.675 0.907 0.482 0.674 0.984 0.889 0.897
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Notes: The Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE:
net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2) ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book
value of total assets; 3) POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4) EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent
variables we employ BS: the number of members in the board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; CEOIN: a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value
of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO;
E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills
and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of
1 otherwise; CRS: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). For
Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected
variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.
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Table 6: Dynamic Panel Regressions Over The Period 2000 To 2012 For US Investment Bank Performance (Compensation
And Ownership)
Compensation Ownership
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8)
Lag Performance 0.3789** 0.4266* 0.3098*** 0.954*** 0.2074* 0.4392*** 0.2592** 0.972***
(0.1919) (0.2245) (0.0779) (0.153) (0.1142) (0.0955) (.1090) (0.148)
E/TA −1.956*** −0.3703* 0.0988 0.0007 −0.0118 −0.1747*** −0.4124** −0.000693*
(0.750) (0.2125) (0.0607) (0.0010) (0.2461) (0.0642) (0.2001) (0.000413)
EARN −0.0377 −0.0117 −0.0555 – −0.0446*** −0.0255**** −0.0616*** –
(0.084) (0.0242) (0.0926) (0.0169) (0.0086) (0.0138)
FEES −0.0225 0.0079 −0.0059 – 0.0554* 0.0262* 0.0924*** –
(0.0505) (0.0440) (0.0200) (0.0278) (0.0152) (0.0175)
RISK 0.0102* 0.0023 0.0018 0.00078 0.0088 0.0028 −0.0041 0.00006
(0.0058) (0.00256) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0117) (0.0019) (0.0119) (0.0005)
PSOX 0.0296 −0.0455 −0.035** 0.00092 −0.0952 −0.0538 −0.1125 0.00011
(0.0435) (0.1178) (0.015) (0.0022) (0.1036) (0.0766) (0.1306) (0.0003)
VIX −0.0045* −0.0026 0.0010 0.00040 −0.0066 −0.0107*** −0.0122*** −0.0000***
(0.0024) (0.00225) (0.0031) (0.00027) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0000)
CRS −0.1245** 0.0534 −0.064* −0.00066*** −0.1408*** −0.1020*** 0.0500 −0.0001***
(0.0624) (0.0543) (0.0362) (0.00002) (0.0360) (0.0313) (0.1102) (0.0000)
EXECASH −0.0483* −0.1121* 0.0215 −0.00016 – – – –
(0.0265) (0.0629) (0.07055) (0.0003)
EXEEQ −0.01853 0.0072*** −0.0089 0.000278 – – – –
(0.0117) (0.00270) (0.0146) (0.0005)
CEOCASH 0.0282*** -0.0730 0.00618*** 0.000145 – – – –
(0.0089) (0.0750) (0.00115) (0.000178) – – –
(Continued)
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Table 6: (Continued)
Compensation Ownership
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8)
CEOEQ 0.0069** 0.0117** 0.00238 0.000327*
(0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0029) (0.000184) –
BOARDOWN – – – – −0.0092*** −0.0042*** −0.0081** 0.00002
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.00003)
CEOOWN – – – – 0.0118** 0.0021 0.0100* 0.00005*
(0.0055) (.0021) (0.0056) (0.00003)
EXEBON – – – – −0.0060 −0.0182 0.0464* 0.00001***
(0.0331) (0.0146) (0.0277) (0.0000)
CEOBON – – – – −0.0053 0.0024 0.0132 0.00001**
(0.0441) (0.0096) (0.0181) (0.0000)
Constant 0.8893 0.2944 0.129 1.72*** 0.2622 0.4694*** 0.3653 −2.80***
(0.6705) (0.2165) (0.796) (0.335) (0.3894) (0.1559) (0.3599) (0.0981)
Wald chi2 324.86*** 52.12*** 424.60*** 412.24*** 464.92*** 253.27*** 2979.09*** 470.30***
AR(1) test stat −1.72* −1.86* −2.04* −2.20** −2.16** −1.97*** −2.32** 2.08**
AR(2) test stat −0.06 0.26 −0.52 −0.73 −0.21 0.06 −1.44 0.14
(Continued)
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Table 6: (Continued)
Compensation Ownership
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8)
Hansen J-stat 0.829 0.595 0.252 0.286 0.522 1 0.516 0.961
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Notes: The Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE:
net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2) ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value
of total assets; 3) POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4) EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables
we employ EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team which includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top
management team which includes restricted stock and stock options; CEOCASH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ:
the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that the directors hold; CEOOWN: the
percentage shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: bonus over executives’ total cash compensation; CEOBON: bonus over CEOs’ total cash compensation; E/TA:
equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and
bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score = (1 + ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of 1
otherwise; CRS: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). For
Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected
variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.
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Table 7: Dynamic Panel Regressions Over The Period 2000 to 2012 For US Investment Bank Performance (Governance
Complexity)
Other Governance characteristics
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4)
Lag performance 0.1844*** 0.2800*** 0.2229* 0.9762***
(0.0676) (0.1077) (0.1180) (0.119)
E/TA 0.2205 −0.4860** −0.8901** −0.0026*
(0.4529) (0.2027) (0.3852) (0.0014)
EARN 0.0114 0.0162 −0.0444 –
(0.0104) (0.0377) (0.066)
FEES 0.0178 −0.0369 0.0172 –
(0.0208) (0.0237) (0.0624)
RISK 0.0192*** 0.0040 0.0019 0.0000*
(0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.00001)
VIX −0.0028 −0.0008 −0.0072*** −0.00003***
(0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.00001)
CRS −0.1503*** −0.0555** −0.1187** −0.00019***
(0.0425) (0.0263) (0.0517) (0.00006)
PSOX −0.0914*** −0.0337 −0.0213 −0.00024*
(0.0275) (0.033) (0.0481) (00014)
NBCOM −0.2694* −0.2261* −0.1477** −0.00061*
(0.1571) 0.1296 (0.0714) (0.00036)
NMAUD 0.1732*** 0.0405 −0.0102 0.00010
(0.0553) (0.0492) (0.0495) (0.00009)
FBCOM 0.00039 −0.0011 −0.7538* 0.00021
(0.00565) (0.0128) (0.444) (0.0015)
SEG 0.0312 −0.1873*** −0.2296*** −0.0003
(0.0859) (0.0491) (0.0872) (0.00025)
(Continued)
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Table 7: (Continued)
Other Governance characteristics
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2) POI(3) EFF(4)
SUB −0.0460 −0.02873** 0.0653 0.00011
(0.0344) (0.0137) (0.0412) (0.00008)
−0.3371 −0.0025 0.7851*** −0.002**
Constant (0.3374) (0.1744) (0.2867) (0.0009)
Wald chi2 83.71*** 554.62*** 218.11*** 479.23***
AR(1) test stat −2.27** −1.67* −1.91* −2.03**
AR(2) test stat −0.37 −0.45 −0.14 0.51
Hansen J-stat 0.747 0.517 0.738 0.744
Instruments 23 23 23 23
Observations 184 184 184 184
Number of banks 23 23 23 23
Notes: The Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE:
net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2) ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book
value of total assets; 3) POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4) EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent
variables we employ NBCOM: the number of board committees; NMAUD: number of meetings of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the
board committees; SEG: the number of different business segments; SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission
and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard
Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year
is 2007–2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected
variables.
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there exists a positive relationship between the ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank
performance (at the 1% level of significance, Table 5, Model 6; at the 5% level of
significance, Table 5, Model 5 and 7).
Concerning the impact of the CEO and TMT compensation on performance,
the results show some variation depending on the different kinds of compensation,
i.e., cash-based or equity-based compensation. Specifically, we find a negative
impact of the cash-based compensation of TMT on bank performance at the 10%
level of significance (Table 6, Model 1 and 2), while there exists a positive impact
of the equity-based compensation of TMT on bank performance at the 1% level
of significance (Table 6, Model 2). These findings are not surprising, since cash-
based compensation does not create sufficient incentives to executives to increase
corporate value, while equity-based compensation constitutes a form of long-term
pay and could align better incentives between executives and shareholders (Jensen
and Murphy, 1998). Regarding the CEO compensation, we find that the CEO cash-
based compensation asserts a positive effect on investment bank performance at
the 1% level of significance (Table 8, Model 1 and 3), as in the previous studies of
Harris and Raviv (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Similarly, we find that
the CEO equity-based compensation has a positive impact on bank performance.
The result remains robust at the 5% (Table 6, Model 1 and 2) and 10% (Table 6,
Model 4) significance level.
Board ownership asserts a negative impact on bank performance at the 1%
(Table 6, Model 5 and 6) and 5% (Table 6, Model 7) significance level. This finding
is consistent with earlier studies (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz,
2012) suggesting that banks with boards of higher bank ownership perform worse
compared to banks with lower board ownership. This is because board members
of high bank ownership position banks in a way that maximize shareholder value.
This behaviour of board members can worsen the performance as banks are
exposed to high risk. On the other hand, CEO ownership has a positive impact
on performance at the 5% (Table 6, Model 5) and 10% (Table 6, Model 7 and
8) significance level. Our finding supports the idea that the partial ownership of
the CEO reduces the agency costs and aligns better shareholders’ and managers’
incentives, resulting in a positive impact on bank performance (Murphy, 1999).
Also, we find evidence of a positive impact of the CEO and TMT bonus as
a percentage of total cash compensation on bank performance. This result is
comparable with that of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) as they find that banks that
pay higher cash bonuses as a proportion of total compensation to their executives
perform better than those that pay lower level of bonuses over total compensation
over the crisis period.
In addition, the dynamic panel estimations reveal a negative impact of oper-
ational complexity on bank performance. We find that an increase in both the
number of different business segments and the total outstanding number of sub-
sidiaries reduces bank performance. The results are robust at the 1% (Table 7,
Model 2 and 3) and 5% (Table 7, Model 2) level of significance. These findings
imply that banks that are characterized by higher operational complexity operate
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Table 8: Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation With Board Size
As Threshold Variable
Investment banks
Threshold estimate
BS 2.30259
95% confidence interval (2.197220 -2.397900)
Impact of board size S.E
λ1 −0.0524 0.046
λ2 −1.3778*** 0.416
Impact of covariates S.E
E/TA −0.538 0.505
RISK 0.0017 0.002
EARN −0.0302** 0.013
FEES 0.0459* 0.025
IND 0.1314 0.105
GD −0.0951 0.157
PSOX −0.0741** 0.034
VIX −0.0042*** 0.001
δ −0.5948*** 0.164
Observations 184
Low regime 117
High regime 67
Notes: The Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each
regime has at least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board
size variable for banks range between 2.1972 and 2.3973. We denote as dependent vari-
able banks’ ROAE (performi t ), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable
we impose the BS (BSi t ), which represents the natural logarithm of banks’ board size.
We assume mi t includes a number of explanatory variables. IND: the percentage of inde-
pendent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; E/TA: equity over total assets;
FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of
trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score =
(1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year
is 2000–2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board
Options Exchange Volatility Index). Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime
dependent intercepts (δ).
less efficiently compared to banks of lower operational complexity. This is so
as in banks of high business complexity, co-ordination problems between spe-
cialists rise, and this can increase correspondingly communication costs of the
bank (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967). Also, we find evidence that an increase in the
number of committees reduces bank performance at the 10% (Table 7, Model 1,
2 and 4) and 5% (Table 7, Model 3) significance level. This implies that although
an increase in the amount of task’s delegation from board to committees might
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reduce the time and effort that boards devote as a group of directors, but could
rise the amount of the resources that the board divert for the supervision of the
increased number of outstanding committees (Vafeas, 1999). Lastly, we also find
that fees paid to board committees are associated negatively to performance at the
1% significance level (Table 7, Model 2 and 3).
In terms of the effect of the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we find
that an increase in leverage (decrease in the equity over total assets ratio) has a
positive impact on performance. The reason being that higher levels of leverage
mitigate the agency costs, between the outside equity and managers, that arise
from the choice of investment (Myers, 1977), the risk of bank liquidation (Harris
and Raviv, 1990) and the undertaken risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We also
report a positive impact of investment banking fees over total assets ratio on bank
performance. Fees constitute the main source of income for investment banks,
hence an increase in fee-income improves bank profitability (Beccalli, 2007;
Micco et al., 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009). Also, the bank’s insolvency risk, as
proxied by the z-score, asserts a negative impact on bank performance consistent
with the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis advanced by Berger and De-Young (1997).13 The
dynamic panel analysis provides also evidence of the negative and significant
impact of other earning assets over total assets ratio on performance. The negative
coefficient suggests that activities such as trading securities may induce high risk
of bank losses (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).
We also find that the VIX indicator has a negative effect on bank perfor-
mance, signifying that increases of market volatility dampen bank performance
consistent with previous studies (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). Also,
as it is expected, there is a negative impact of the financial crisis dummy on bank
performance (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Lastly, we find a strong negative impact
of the PSOX period on performance, indicating that high board independency re-
duces the level of meeting attendance of the independent board members (Adams
and Ferreira, 2007) that in turn increases free-riding problems (Jensen, 1993).
THRESHOLD DYNAMIC PANEL ANALYSIS
In this section, we opt for the dynamic panel threshold methodology (Kremer
et al., 2013) and investigate the presence of possible threshold-effects of important
corporate governance variables with respect to investment bank performance. We
employ this econometric technique for two of the key variables of our previous
analysis (5.1). These are the board size and board ownership that we find them to
be associated negatively with investment bank performance.
A study by Yemack et al. (1996) shows that there is a trade-off between ad-
vantages and disadvantages of large boards. On the one hand, banks with large
13Under the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis, if an unexpected exogenous to the bank financial shock increases the
risk of a bank, the bank would start spending more resources in risk-monitoring operations increasing in
this way its costs and consequently decreasing its net profits and performance (Berger and De-Young,
1997) .
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boards increase the monitoring and expertise to deal with problems of the specific-
bank environment. On the other hand, large boards decrease the control and the
effective communication between board members. Based on these arguments, we
believe that is essential to investigate possible threshold-effects of the board size
impact on investment bank performance. In addition, agency theory argues that
an increase in the board ownership better aligns incentives between managers
and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Murphy, 1999).
Therefore, boards that hold higher ownership are more likely to take decisions
to increase the corporate value. However, our findings in the dynamic panel es-
timations (5.1) indicate that an increase in the board ownership decreases bank
performance, as in Beltrazzi and Stulz (2011). To this end, the threshold analysis
enables to investigate, if and at which level, the board ownership asserts a positive
impact on investment bank performance.
Our analysis finds a threshold value of the board size around ten members.14
This threshold value splits the sample into two regimes. The low regime with
banks that have board size lower than ten members and the high regime with
banks of more than ten members in their boards. The results indicate that there
is a highly negative impact at the 1% level of the board size on investment bank
performance for the high regime banks, as λ2 = −1.3778 (see Table 8). This
finding is consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). Moreover, the threshold value indicates that the board size of investment
banks should be less than ten members, which is similar to the argument of Lipton
and Lorsch (1992) who suggest the restraining of the membership of boards to ten
people, with a desired size of eight or nine members. Regarding the impact of the
board size on bank performance for the low regime banks, we still find a negative
coefficient but the result is not statistically significant.
Moreover, Table 9 shows that the percentage of banks with large boards con-
stantly increases and reaches the highest level (53%) in 2007. This implies that the
majority of the US investment banks underperformed with an increase in board
size above the threshold value of 10 board members. After the burst of the finan-
cial crisis, we observe a sharp decrease (from 53% to 27%) in the proportion of
investment banks that had large boards, suggesting that these financial institutions
opted to scale down agency costs caused by large boards during the period of the
turmoil.
Regarding the board ownership threshold analysis, we find a threshold value
of 8.54% (see Table 10). This value splits the sample into investment banks with
boards that hold higher ownership (high regime) and those with boards that hold
lower ownership (low regime). We find that for banks in the low regime, an increase
in the board ownership has a negative impact on performance at the 1% level of
significance (λ1 = −0.026). This result is similar to that in the previous section
(5.1). However, it further reveals that the negative impact of board ownership
14We use the natural logarithm of the board size to perform our estimation. The threshold value that is
equal to 10 members (exponential value of 2.30259).
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Table 9: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: Classification of Investment Banks Into the Two Identified Regimes Based on
Threshold Value of Board Size
Threshold: Board size
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011
Low regime 70% 62% 64% 64% 67% 56% 56% 47% 73% 65% 75% 73% 62%
High regime 30% 38% 36% 36% 33% 44% 44% 53% 27% 35% 25% 27% 38%
Notes: Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board size (natural logarithm) threshold value that we obtained following
Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel.
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Table 10: Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation With Board
Ownership as Threshold Variable
Investment banks
Threshold estimate
BOARDOWN 8.54313
95% confidence interval (0.276317–23.428200)
Impact of Board ownership S.E
λ1 −0.026*** 0.008
λ2 0.116** 0.053
Impact of covariates S.E
E/TA −0.4462 0.380
RISK 0.0022* 0.001
EARN −0.0163 0.011
FEES 0.0423** 0.021
CEOOWN 0.0055** 0.002
EXEBON 0.0069*** 0.001
CEOBON −0.0017*** 0.000
PSOX −0.0716** 0.031
VIX −0.0021* 0.001
δ −0.0006 0.001
Observations 184
Low regime 94
High regime 90
Notes: The Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each
regime has at least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board
ownership variable for banks range between 0.276317 and 23.4282. We denote as dependent
variable banks’ ROAE(performi t ), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable
we impose the BOARDOWN (BOARDOWNi t ), which represents the percentage of bank’s
shares hold by the board members. We assume mi t includes a number of explanatory
variables. Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ).
CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: bonus over executives’
total cash compensation; CEOBON: bonus over CEOs’ total cash compensation; E/TA:
equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total
assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total
assets; RISK: Z-score = (1 + ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which
takes the value of 0 if year is 2000–2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: Volatility
Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).
refers explicitly to banks that have lower levels of board ownership, that is below
the threshold value. By contrast, turning to the high regime, which denotes banks
of board ownership above the threshold value, we find that there is a positive
relationship between the board ownership and performance at the 5% level of
significance (λ2 = 0.116). The result is confirmed by the agency theory (Jensen
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Table 11: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two identified regimes based on threshold
value of Board ownership
Threshold: Board ownership
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011
Low regime 70% 69% 50% 57% 53% 50% 44% 47% 53% 35% 50% 53% 46%
High regime 30% 31% 50% 43% 47% 50% 56% 53% 47% 65% 50% 47% 54%
Notes: Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board ownership threshold value that we obtained following Kremer’s
et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel.
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and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt,1989) and a number of previous studies that
indicate a positive impact of the managerial ownership on performance (Kosnik,
1990; Malatesta et al., 1988; Pi and Timme, 1993).
Lastly, Table 11 shows that there is a constant increase over time in the per-
centage of banks that belong to the low regime, which includes banks with boards
that hold lower levels of ownership (below the threshold value). In the 2005–2007
period, we also observe that the majority of investment banks is classified in the
high regime, indicating that during the financial crisis period investment banks
opted for higher level of board ownership (above the threshold value).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate the impact of corporate governance on the perfor-
mance of the US investment banks for the 2000–2012 period. We find that there
is a negative relationship between the board size and performance. The threshold
analysis reveals that this negative impact is enhanced when board size increases
above the critical value of around ten board members. This implies that above
a threshold value the rising costs of monitoring and communication deteriorates
the performance of investment banks, consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothe-
sis (Jensen, 1993). Adams and Mehran (2008) and Andres and Vallelado (2008)
show that the impact of the board size on the performance of commercial banks
is positive. Hence, investment banks appear to react differently compare to other
type of banks with respect to the effect of the board size on performance. Thresh-
old analysis also reveals that most of investment banks scaled down the board
size, aiming to reduce agency conflicts that banks with large boards suffer from,
since the crisis of 2007. Also, we find evidence that the CEO power exerts a
positive impact on bank performance consistent with the ‘stewardship’ hypothesis
(Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990). This indicates that investment banks perform
better when the CEO chairs the board or has a long-term relationship with the
bank. Thus, investment banks could benefit from the unity of control that the
powerful CEO would offer. Our results shed new light and provide an alternative
view to Mishra and Nielsen (2000) who argue that the CEO power has a negative
impact on the performance of commercial banks. With regards to the ownership
held by the board we find, similarly to Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that it has a neg-
ative impact on performance. This effect is present predominantly in banks with
board ownership below a threshold value. By contrast, the impact of board own-
ership on investment bank performance turns to positive above a threshold value.
Additionally, we find evidence of a negative association between the operational
complexity and bank performance.
Our results, also in the light of the financial crisis, are of importance for both
policy makers and market participants. In response to the severe financial crisis,
regulators in the US passed the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), a major financial reform
that has a significant impact on bank corporate governance along with other as-
pects of the financial markets. The transformation of investment banks into BHCs
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and their subsequent access into the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) support
(Volcker, 2010) and other subsidy programs, such as the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), could lead to a rise in moral hazard problems for investment
banks. Therefore, policy makers should ensure that the corporate governance of
investment banks is geared towards structures that are beneficial to performance of
these institutions. To this end, the identification of threshold-effects in this study
could be of assistance to future regulatory mandates. Regulators could look for
example at the empirical evidence whereby investment bank performance declines
with board’s size more than ten members, while enhances with boards’ ownership
above a threshold value.
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